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Abstract
Near-term quantum computers are likely to have small depths due to short coherence time
and noisy gates. A natural approach to leverage these quantum computers is interleaving them
with classical computers. Understanding the capabilities and limits of this hybrid approach is an
essential topic in quantum computation. Most notably, the quantum Fourier transform can be
implemented by a hybrid of logarithmic-depth quantum circuits and a classical polynomial-time
algorithm. Therefore, it seems possible that quantum polylogarithmic depth is as powerful as
quantum polynomial depth in the presence of classical computation.
Indeed, Jozsa conjectured that “Any quantum polynomial-time algorithm can be implemented
with only O(log n) quantum depth interspersed with polynomial-time classical computations.”
This can be formalized as asserting the equivalence of BQP and “BQNCBPP”. On the other
hand, Aaronson conjectured that “there exists an oracle separation between BQP and BPPBQNC.”
BQNCBPP and BPPBQNC are two natural and seeming incomparable ways of hybrid classical-
quantum computation.
In this work, we manage to prove Aaronson’s conjecture and in the meantime disproves
Jozsa’s conjecture relative to an oracle. In fact, we prove a stronger statement that for any
depth parameter d, there exists an oracle that separates quantum depth d and 2d + 1 in the
presence of classical computation. Thus, our results show that relative to oracles, doubling the
quantum circuit depth indeed gives the hybrid model more power, and this cannot be traded
by classical computation.
1 Introduction
Circuit depth may become an essential consideration when designing algorithms on near-term
quantum computers. Quantum computers with more than 50 qubits have been realized recently
by Google [Kel18] and IBM [IBM17]; both the quantity and quality of the qubits are continually
improving. Furthermore, Google and NASA recently showed that their quantum computer outper-
forms the best supercomputers on the task of random circuit sampling [AAB+19]. However, due
to noisy gates and limited coherence time, these quantum computers are only able to operate for a
short period. Hence the effective circuit depths of these quantum computers are limited,∗ and this
seems to be an essential bottleneck for quantum technologies.
Studies from a theoretical perspective indicate that small-depth quantum computers can demon-
strate so-called “Quantum Supremacy” [AC17, TD04], which means solving some computational
problems that are intractable for classical computers. Terhal and DiVincenzo first showed that
∗Indeed, the experiments of Google and NASA consider circuits with depth at most 20.
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constant-depth quantum circuits can sample certain distributions that are intractable for classi-
cal computers under some plausible complexity conjecture [TD04], and more recent works showed
that this can be based on the conjecture that the polynomial hierarchy (PH) is infinite [AC17].
Aaronson and Chen showed that under a natural average-case hardness assumption, there exists
a statistical test such that no polynomial-time classical algorithm can pass it, but a small-depth
quantum circuit can [AC17].
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the capability of constant-depth quantum computers
is limited. Specifically, consider the standard setting where the composing gate set only includes
one- and two-qubit gates. It is obvious that a constant-depth quantum circuit cannot solve any
classically intractable decision problem or even some classically easy problems, e.g., computing a
parity function. This is because that each output qubit depends on only O(1) input qubits. Al-
though involving unbounded fan-out gates allows a quantum circuit to conduct many operations in
small depth, such as parity, mod[q], threshold[t], arithmetic operations, phase estimations, and the
quantum Fourier transform [HS05], it seems that unbounded fan-out gates are hard to implement
in practice and thus is rarely considered for near-term quantum device.†
A natural idea to exploit the power of small-depth quantum computers is interleaving them
with classical computers. Many of the known quantum algorithms require only small depths in the
quantum part. Notably, Cleve and Watrous showed that the quantum Fourier transform can be par-
allelized to have only logarithmic quantum depth [CW00], which implies that quantum algorithms
for abelian hidden subgroup problems, such as Shor’s factoring algorithm, can be implemented
with logarithmic quantum depth. Therefore, “quantum polylogarithmic depth is as powerful as
quantum polynomial depth in the presence of classical computation” seems to be a live possibility!
Aware of this possibility, Jozsa [Joz05] conjectured that
“Any polynomial time quantum algorithm can be implemented with only O(log n) quantum
depth interspersed with polynomial-time classical computations.”
Nevertheless, there are other opinions in the community. It has been conjectured by Aaron-
son [Aar05, Aar10, Aar11, Aar19] more than a decade ago that
“There exists an oracle O relative to which BQP 6= BPPQNC.”
Here, BPPBQNC is corresponding to one of the hybrid approaches for interleaving classical comput-
ers with small-depth quantum circuits. It is worth noting that the models Jozsa and Aaronson
considered were related but different, and we will clarify this later in Section 1.2.
In this work, we disprove Jozsa’s conjecture and prove Aaronson’s conjecture. In fact, we prove
a stronger conclusion that relative to oracles, doubling the quantum circuit depth already gives the
computational model more power, and this cannot be traded by classical computations.
1.1 Main Results
We start by defining two hybrid models, which interleave d-depth quantum circuits and classical
computers. The first scheme, called d-depth quantum-classical scheme (d-QC scheme), is a general-
ized model for small-depth measurement-based quantum computers (MBQC). The second scheme,
called d-depth classical-quantum scheme (d-CQ scheme), characterizes the hybrid quantum and
classical computations. Briefly, a d-QC scheme is based on a d-depth quantum circuit and can
access some classical computational resources after each level, while a d-CQ scheme is based on a
classical computer with access to some d-depth quantum circuits. We (informally) define BQNCBPPd
†Our oracle separation results hold even if the unbounded fan-out gates are allowed.
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to be the set of languages decided by d-QC schemes, and BPPBQNCd to be the set of languages de-
cided by d-CQ schemes. Also, when we write BQNCBPP (resp., BPPBQNC), we refer to the union of
BQNCBPP
logk n
(resp., BPPBQNClogk n) for constant k ∈ N. (These definitions will be formally given in
Section 3.)
Note that Jozsa’s conjecture refers to the equivalence problem of BQP and the hybrid model
d-QC schemes, and Aaronson’s conjecture refers to the separation between BQP and the other
hybrid model d-CQ schemes. As we shall see, we will introduce an oracle problem below, which
can be used to show separation results for both conjectures.
Our oracle problem is a variant of Simon’s problem. Given a function f : Zn2 → Zn2 with the
promise that there exists s ∈ Zn2 such that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) for x ∈ Zn2 , Simon’s problem is to
find s [Sim94]. Such two-to-one function f is called a Simon function. Simon’s problem is easy for
quantum-polynomial-time (QPT) algorithms but hard for all probabilistic-polynomial-time (PPT)
algorithms; however, Simon’s problem can be solved by a constant-depth quantum circuit with
classical postprocessing.
To devise a harder problem, we first represent a Simon function as a composition of random
one-to-one functions f0, . . . , fd−1 and a two-to-one function fd such that f = fd ◦ · · · ◦ f0 as shown
in Fig. 1, where fj : Sj → Sj+1 has domain Sj and range Sj+1 for j = 0, . . . , d. Suppose that f is
hidden and only access to these functions fi are provided. If f0, . . . , fd must be queried in sequence
to evaluate f , then a d-depth quantum circuit cannot solve this variant of Simon’s problem, since
it can only make at most d sequential queries (but there are d+ 1 random functions).
Figure 1: Composing d random one-to-one function f0, . . . , fd−1 and a two-to-one function fd such
that f = fd ◦ · · · ◦ f0.
Nevertheless, a cleverer approach that does not query the functions in sequence might exist.
To rule out the possibility of such an approach, we further make it infeasible for the domain
of fi to be accessed before the (i+ 1)-th parallel queries. Specifically, fj is now defined on
a larger domain S
(0)
j such that Sj is a subset of S
(0)
j and |Sj |/|S(0)j | is chosen to be negligible for
j = 0, 1, . . . , d+ 1. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Therefore, to evaluate fi, one must find the target
domain Si from the larger domain S
(0)
i , and the success probability is negligible by construction. It
is worth noting that an algorithm can learn Si after the i-th query with probability one, and thus
is able to evaluate f after d+ 1 sequential queries. However, using at most d sequential queries is
still not enough for the algorithm to evaluate f .
To sum up, the oracle we consider is as follows. Let f be an arbitrary Simon function. Choose a
sequence of random one-to-one functions f0, . . . , fd−1 defined on much larger domains S
(0)
0 , . . . , S
(0)
d ,
respectively, and let fd be a two-to-one function such that fd ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x) = f(x) for x ∈ S0. We
define the shuffling oracle of f with respect to f1, . . . , fd−1 to be an oracle that returns a value of
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Figure 2: The shuffling oracle: f0, . . . , fd−1 are random one-to-one functions on a greater domain.
For x ∈ S0, f(x) = fd ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x).
f0, . . . , fd−1 or fd when queried. Thus an algorithm with access to this oracle can access f0, . . . , fd.
We will simply call it the shuffling oracle of f in the following without mentioning the underlying
f0, . . . , fd−1.
The d-Shuffling Simon’s Problem (d-SSP) is a decision problem defined as follows:
Definition 1.1 (d-SSP (Informal)). Let f be a random one-to-one function or a random Simon
function. Given oracle access to the shuffling oracle of f (as in Fig. 2), the problem is to decide
whether f is a Simon function or not.
We summarize our results in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For any d, d-SSP ∈ (BQNCBPP2d+1)O ∩ (BPPBQNC2d+1)O, but d-SSP /∈
(BQNCBPPd )
O ∪ (BPPBQNCdO), where O is the shuffling oracle of f . ‡
Theorem 1.2 states that relative to the shuffling oracles, (2d+1)-QC schemes (resp., (2d+1)-CQ
schemes) are strictly more powerful than d-QC schemes (resp., d-CQ schemes). Namely, doubling
the quantum circuit depth indeed gives the hybrid model more power, and this cannot be traded
for classical computation.
Theorem 1.2 immediately implies the following corollary, which states that Jozsa’s conjecture
is false relative to an oracle.
Corollary 1.3 (Informal). For d = logω(1) n, d-SSP ∈ BQPO, but d-SSP /∈ (BPPBQNC)O ∪
(BQNCBPP)O, where O is the shuffling oracle of f .
1.2 Discussion and Open Problems
Jozsa’s and Aaronson’s conjectures The hybrid model Jozsa considered in [Joz05] is the
small-depth MBQC, which is characterized by the d-QC scheme in this work. On the other hand,
Aaronson considered the complexity class BPPBQNC, which is corresponding to the d-CQ scheme
defined in this paper.
Since we cannot even prove that BPP 6= BQP, an unconditional separation seems unachievable
by the state-of-the-art techniques. Instead, we can expect an oracle separation or a conditional lower
‡Following the definition of BQNCBPPd and BPP
BQNCd , the gate set is the collection of one- and two-qubit gates.
However, our oracle separation actually works for any gate set even with unbounded fan-out gates. The main point
is that the depth of the queries is less than the depth of the shuffling oracle.
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bound based on certain assumptions in cryptography or complexity. In this work, we obtain an
oracle separation between BQP and BPPBQNC∪BQNCBPP. Therefore, one central question is: can we
achieve a conditional separation based on plausible assumptions, or equivalently, can we instantiate
our oracle? A natural approach is to instantiate it based on cryptographic assumptions, such as
virtual-black-box (VBB) obfuscations. However, while it is possible to make our oracle efficient,
since our oracle uses random shuffling to hide the Simon’s function, we may not assume secure VBB
obfuscation of our oracle given the known negative evidence by Bitansky et al. [BCC+14]. It is not
clear whether our oracle can be instantiated based on any reasonable cryptographic assumptions.
Our work also address another critical question: can we trade classical computations for quan-
tum circuit depth? If this is possible, then it may be easier for near-term quantum computers to
achieve quantum supremacy on practical problems. In this work, we give some negative evidence by
showing a fine-grained depth separation result that (BPPBQNCd)O 6= (BPPBQNC2d+1)O. This result
implies that doubling the quantum depth gives the model more power, and this cannot be traded
by classical computations in the relativized world. We would like to see if we can obtain a sharper
separation, such as d versus d+ 1, under plausible assumptions in cryptography or complexity.
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1.4 Independent Work
Independent and concurrent to our work, Coudron and Menda also investigated Jozsa’s conjecture
and proved that the conjecture is false relative to some oracle [CM19a]. However, they did not
establish the sharp separation between quantum depth d vs. 2d + 1 as we did. Interestingly, the
oracle problem used in their work as well as the analysis are very different from ours, which may lead
to incomparable extensions or applications in the future. In the following, we provide a high-level
discussion and compare the two works.
At a high-level, Coudron and Menda use the Welded Tree Problem of Childs et al. [CCD+03] as
the oracle problem to disprove Jozsa’s conjecture, which leverage the separation between quantum
walk and classical random walk. To show the separation, they do not need to modify the oracle
problem, and the crux is a simulation argument showing that low depth quantum computation
can be simulated by (inefficient) classical computation without blowing up the number of oracle
queries too much. Hence, the hardness of the hybrid models follows by the classical hardness. The
simulation argument relies on the structure of the welded tree oracle and does not seem to apply
to our oracle.
In contrast, our starting point is Simon’s problem, which can be viewed as a separation between
quantum depth 0 (i.e., classical computation) and 1 in the hybrid models, and our main idea is
to lift the separation by pointer chasing and domain hiding. This allows us to prove the sharp
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separation between quantum depth d vs. 2d+ 1. To prove the separation, we generalize techniques
in cryptography (from both quantum and classical crypto literature) to show that small quantum
depth is not enough to find the hidden domain and hence the hybrid models with quantum depth
d are not capable to solve the d-SSP problem.
We mention that the original version of Coudron and Menda [CM19a] only explicitly considered
the hybrid model d-CQ schemes, but their analysis extends directly to establish hardness of the
Welded Tree Problem for d-QC schemes. Furthermore, we believe that the techniques in both
works extend to establish hardness of respective oracle problems for the natural hierarchy of hybrid
models like BPPBQNC
BPP···
[CM19b].
2 Proof Overview
The main idea behind our shuffling oracle is combining pointer chasing and domain hiding to lift
the hardness of Simon’s problem. We start with the intuition behind our construction.
Pointer Chasing & Domain Hiding The pointer chasing is to allow the function to be eval-
uated by using d + 1 parallel queries, but make it hard by using at most d parallel queries. To
implement this idea, we decompose a Simon function f as f0, . . . , fd, where f0, . . . , fd−1 are random
“shufflings” of the original function and fd is the function such that f = fd ◦ · · · ◦ f0. Ideally, to
evaluate f , a standard approach is to evaluate the functions in sequence. However, it is unclear if
there are clever methods. To tackle this, our second idea is hiding the original domains S0, . . . , Sd
in larger domains S
(0)
0 , . . . , S
(0)
d , respectively. Intuitively, to evaluate f , one needs to learn fd in Sd,
or say, needs to find Sd in S
(0)
d . Note that it suffices to use i rounds of parallel queries to learn Si.
The goal of the shuffling oracle is to obtain the (tight) hardness that it prevents the algorithm from
learning Sd before dth parallel queries so that one cannot evaluate fd in the dth parallel queries.
Obtaining Indistinguishability from Hiding The intuition behind our analysis is similar to
the One-way-to-Hiding (O2H) Lemma [AHU18, Unr15] in quantum cryptography, and our analysis
can be viewed as generalizing the lemma to the setting of the shuffling oracle against both hybrid
models. Briefly, the O2H Lemma shows that given any two random functions which have same
function values on most elements except for some hidden subset, we can bound the probability
of distinguishing these two functions by the probability that the queries are in the hidden set,
which we call the finding probability. This probability will be negligible if the subset is a small
enough random subset. The O2H Lemma implies that given a random function, we can program
the mappings in the hidden subset arbitrarily. In our context, a natural approach is to argue that
Sd is a hidden subset in S
(0)
d and hence we can indistinguishably program the mappings in Sd in
a way such that the programmed oracle has no information about f . However, different from the
typical use of O2H Lemma in cryptography, in the shuffling oracle, the algorithm can find Sd by
using d parallel queries starting from S0 (and query Sd at the d + 1st query), so we need to be
careful in arguing that Sd is a hidden subset.
Russian-Nesting-Doll Trick We bypass the difficulty above by partitioning the large set S
(0)
d
into a series of smaller subsets S
(1)
d , . . . , S
(d)
d , such that S
(`)
d is a exponentially small subset of
S
(`−1)
d for ` ∈ [d], and for the ease of illustrating ideas, Sd ⊂ S(d)d §. We do such partition for all
§For the proof of d-QC and d-CQ scheme, there will be a small subset in Sd which is not in S
(d)
d ; however, we will
show in the proof that it suffices to prove the oracle separation.
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Figure 3: The domains partitions under the Russian-nesting-doll trick: f0 on S
(0)
0 and f1, . . . , fd on
S
(0)
1 \ S(1)1 , . . . , S(0)d \ S(1)d can be viewed as the “first doll”, which will be opened by the first round
parallel queries. Along this line, fi−1 on S
(i−1)
i−1 and fi, . . . , fd on S
(i−1)
i \ S(i)i , . . . , S(i−1)d \ S(i)d can
be viewed as the ith doll, which will be opened by the ith round parallel queries.
domains of f0, . . . , fd. Then, we use the O2H Lemma to show that after the first parallel query, the
algorithm can learn f0 on S
(0)
0 and f1, . . . , fd on domains out of S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(1)
d ; however, it learns
nothing about f1, . . . , fd on S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(1)
d . For the second parallel queries, we start from f1, . . . , fd
on S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(1)
d , and use the O2H Lemma again to argue that the algorithm learns little about
f2, . . . , fd on S
(2)
2 , . . . , S
(2)
d . Finally, for the dth parallel queries, the algorithm has no information
about fd on S
(d)
d and thus has no information about f . We can think of this approach as a Russian-
nesting-doll trick: the mappings f0 on S
(0)
0 and f1, . . . , fd on domains out of S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(1)
d are the
largest doll outside, there are d dolls, and fd on S
(d)
d is the smallest one we want to see. For an
algorithm to see Sd, it needs to open all the dolls, and each requires one round parallel queries;
therefore, the algorithm cannot see the smallest doll before dth parallel queries. We illustrate the
idea of the Russian-nesting-doll trick as in Fig. 3.
We give a brief overview of how to formalize the ideas above in the follows.
2.1 QNCd circuit
This is the warm-up case. Let U := U1, . . . , Ud+1 be a d-depth quantum circuit which can make
superposed queries to the shuffling oracle F := (f0, . . . , fd) after Ui for i ∈ [d]. We represent the
computation as
Ud+1FUd · · · FU1.
Following the Russian-nesting-doll trick, we partition the domains S
(0)
0 , . . . , S
(0)
d into d subsets.
Then, for the ith parallel queries, we construct a shadow oracle Gi of F such that Gi agrees with F on
elements out of S
(j)
j , . . . , S
(j)
d , but maps the rest to ⊥ (a specific notation for no information). Here,
we need to choose the subsets in a specific way, which we will describe in the formal proof. By using
hybrid arguments and O2H Lemma, we inductively prove that Ud+1FUd · · · FU1 is indistinguishable
from Ud+1GdUd · · · G1U1.
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2.2 d-QC scheme
For the d-QC scheme, since the classical algorithm can make polynomial classical parallel queries,
the set Sd can be found by the classical algorithm. However, the classical algorithm can only make
polynomially many queries, and the rest of the points which are not queried are still uniform.
Therefore, we can remove whatever points learned by classical queries from the hidden sets S
(j)
k ,
and use O2H Lemma and the hybrid arguments as before. At the end, the algorithm does not
learn Sd except for polynomially many points, which is unlikely to learn the shift (as in the proof
of classical hardness for Simons).
2.3 d-CQ scheme
Arguing that Sd is a hidden subset in S
(0)
d against the d-CQ scheme is the most challenging part
of our analysis. The main obstacle is that the measurement outcome of the quantum circuit can
contain global information about the shuffling oracle, and this makes it hard to reason that the
shuffling oracle is still uniformly random conditioned on the measurement outcome. However, since
the measurement outcomes can only be a “short classical advice”, intuitively, it cannot contain too
much information about the shuffling oracle.
To formalize this intuition, we (partially) generalize a presampling argument in (classical) cryp-
tography [CDGS18, Unr07]. Informally, the argument states that a random function conditioned
on a short classical advice string is indistinguishable from a convex combination of random func-
tions that are fixed on a few elements for any classical algorithm making polynomial queries.
Ideally, we would like to generalize it to the shuffling oracle (which is more complicated than ran-
dom oracle) and show indistinguishability to a convex combination of shuffling oracles with a few
points fixed for quantum algorithms with a bounded number of queries. Unfortunately, we do not
know how to achieve this, but we prove something weaker that is sufficient: we show that given
a short classical advice string, the shuffling oracle is indistinguishable from a convex combination
of “almost-uniform” shuffling oracles with few points fixed for any quantum algorithm making one
quantum parallel query.
This weaker statement suffices to prove our oracle separation. While there are some further
subtleties, the main idea is that we apply it inductively after each quantum parallel query, and the
short advice string only fixes polynomially many random points in the shuffling oracle. Given this,
we are able to show that Sd remains a hidden set against the d-CQ scheme and establish hardness
of d-SSP against BPPBQNCd .
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the distance measures of quantum states. Then, we give formal
definitions of the d-CQ and d-QC schemes.
3.1 State distance
Definition 3.1. Let H be a Hilbert space. For any two pure states |ψ〉, |φ〉 ∈ H, we define
• (Fidelity) F (|ψ〉, |φ〉) := |〈ψ|φ〉|;
• (Two-norm distance) ‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖.
Then, we define distance measures between mixed states.
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Definition 3.2. Let H be a Hilbert space. For any two mixed states ρ, ρ′ ∈ H,
• (Fidelity) F (ρ, ρ′) := tr(√√ρρ′√ρ).
• (Trace distance) TD(ρ, ρ′) := 12 Tr |ρ− ρ′|.
• (Bures distance) B(ρ, ρ′) := √2− 2F (ρ, ρ′).
The probability for a quantum procedure to distinguish two states can be bounded by the Bures
distance between the two states.
Claim 3.3. For any two mixed states ρ and ρ′, for any quantum algorithm A and for any classical
string s,
|Pr[A(ρ) = s]− Pr[A(ρ′) = s]| ≤ B(ρ, ρ′).
Proof. It is well-known that |Pr[A(ρ) = s]− Pr[A(ρ′) = s]| ≤ 12 Tr |ρ− ρ′|. Then,
TD(ρ, ρ′) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, ρ′)2
=
√
1 + F (ρ, ρ′)
2
√
2− 2F (ρ, ρ′)
≤ B(ρ, ρ′).
The state distance and Claim 3.3 will be used shortly in the following sections.
3.2 Computational Model
We here define two schemes which interleave low-depth quantum circuits and classical computers.
The first scheme is called d-depth quantum-classical scheme (d-QC scheme) and the second scheme
is d-depth classical-quantum scheme (d-CQ scheme).
We say a set of gates forms a layer if all the gates in the set operate on disjoint qubits. Gates in
the same layer can be parallelly applied. We define the number of layers in a circuit as the depth of
the circuit. In the following, we define circuit families which has circuit depth d as in [TD04, MN98].
Definition 3.4 (d-depth quantum circuit QNCd). A QNCd quantum circuit family {Cn : n > 0} is
defined as below:
• There exists a polynomial p such that for all n > 0, Cn operates on n input qubits and p(n)
ancilla qubits;
• for n > 0, Cn has the initial state |0n+p(n)〉, consists of d layers of one- and two-qubit gates,
and measures all qubits after the last layer.
We can illustrate a QNCd circuit as in Fig. 4, where Ui for i ∈ [d] is a unitary which can
be implemented by one layer of one- and two-qubit gates, and the last computational unit is a
qubit-wise measurement in the standard basis.
In some studies, QNC is also used to refer the set of languages decided by the quantum circuits.
For clarity, we define the set of languages decided by QNCd as BQNCd as follows:
Definition 3.5 (BQNCd). The set of languages L = {Ln : n > 0} for which there exists a circuit
family {Cn : n > 0} ∈ QNCd such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
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Figure 4: The QNCd circuit: The single-line wires are the quantum wires, and the double-line wire
is the classical wire.
• if x ∈ Ln, then Pr[Cn(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[Cn(x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
Then we define the quantum analogue of Nick’s class
Definition 3.6 (BQNCk). The set of languages L = {Ln : n > 0} for which there exists a circuit
family {Cn : n > 0} ∈ QNCd for d = O(logk n) such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
• if x ∈ Ln, then Pr[Cn(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[Cn(x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
For simplicity, we define BQNC as the set of languages which can be decided by poly log-depth
quantum circuit that is BQNC :=
⋃
k BQNC
k.
A d-depth quantum circuit with oracle access to some classical function f is a sequence of
operations
U1
q−→ f q−→ U2 q−→ f q−→ · · ·Ud q−→ f q−→ Ud+1, (1)
where Ui’s are unitaries as we have defined in 3.4. The transition
q−→ implies that Ui can send and
receive quantum messages from f . We add an additional layer of unitary Ud+1 to the computational
model to process the information from the last call of f .
In the quantum query model, we usually consider f as an unitary operator Uf
Uf |x〉|0〉 = |x〉|f(x)〉.
We represent the process in Eq. 1 as follows: let |0, 0〉QA|0〉W be the initial state, where registers Q
and A consist of qubits the algorithm sends to or receives from the oracle and register W consists
of the rest of the qubits the algorithm holds as working space. Let
U1|0, 0〉QA|0〉W =
∑
x,y
c(x, y)|x, y〉QA|z(x, y)〉W
be the quantum message before applying the first Uf . After applying Uf ,
Uf
∑
x,y
c(x, y)|x, y〉QA|z(x, y)〉W =
∑
x,y
c(x, y)|x, y ⊕ f(x)〉QA|z(x, y)〉W .
We represent Eq. 1 as a sequence of unitaries Ud+1UfUd · · ·UfU1 in this way. For simplicity, we
rewrite Eq. 1 as Ud+1fUd · · · fU1 in the rest of the paper.
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Figure 5: The d-depth quantum-classical (d-QC) scheme: The single-line wires stands for the
quantum wires, and the double-line wires are for classical wires.
3.2.1 The d-QC Scheme and BQNCBPPd
The first scheme we consider is the d-QC scheme, which is a generalized model for d-depth MBQC
and can be represented as the following sequence
Ac c−→ (Π0/1 ⊗ I) ◦ U (1) c−→ Ac c/q−−→ · · · c/q−−→ (Π0/1 ⊗ I) ◦ U (d) c−→ Ac, (2)
where Ac is a randomized algorithm, U (i) is a single-depth quantum circuit, and Π0/1 is a projective
measurement in the standard basis on a subset of the qubits. The arrows
c−→ and q−→ indicate the
classical and quantum messages transmitted. We illustrate the scheme as in Fig. 5
In this model, after applying U (i), one measures a subset of qubits, uses the measurement
outcome to decide U (i+1) by the classical polynomial algorithm Ac, and then apply U (i+1) to the
rest of the qubits. Let L(i) be the procedure Ac → c(Π0/1 ⊗ I) ◦ U (i). Then, we rewrite Eq. 2 as
L(1)
c/q−−→ · · · c/q−−→ L(d) c−→ Ac. (3)
Then, we define the languages which can be decided by d-QC scheme.
Definition 3.7 (BQNCBPPd ). The set of languages L = {Ln : n > 0} for which there exists a family
of d-QC schemes {An : n > 0} such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
• if x ∈ Ln, then Pr[An(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[An(x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
Let A be a d-QC scheme with access to some oracle O. We represent AO as a sequence of
operators:
(L(1))O
c/q−−→ · · · c/q−−→ (L(d))O c−→ AOc , (4)
where (L(i))O := AOc c−→ (Π0/1 ⊗ I) ◦ OU (i). We illustrate the scheme as in Fig. 6.
Definition 3.8 ((BQNCBPPd )
O
). The set of languages LO := {LOn : n > 0} for which there exists a
family of d-QC schemes {AOn : n > 0} such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
• if x ∈ LOn , then Pr[AOn (x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[AOn (x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
Similar to the definition of BQNC, we define BQNCBPP as a set of languages which can be
decided by a family of d-QC schemes with d = O(poly log n).
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Figure 6: The d-QC scheme with access to an oracle O
Figure 7: The d-depth classical-quantum (d-CQ) scheme
3.2.2 The d-CQ scheme and BPPBQNCd
Here we define the d-CQ scheme that is a classical algorithm which has access to a QNCd circuit
during the computation. We represent the scheme as follows:
Ac,1 c−→ Π0/1 ◦ C c−→ · · · c−→ Ac,m c−→ Π0/1 ◦ C c−→ Ac,m+1, (5)
where m = poly(n), Ac,i is a randomized algorithm, C is a d-depth quantum circuit, and Π0/1 is
the standard-basis measurement. We illustrate the scheme as in Fig. 7.
In this scheme, the classical algorithm can perform queries to the QNCd circuit, and then use
the measurement outcomes from the circuit as part of the input to the following procedures. We
let L(i) := Ac,i c−→ Π0/1 ◦ C and rewrite Eq. 5 as
L(1)
c−→ L(2) c−→ · · · c−→ L(m) c−→ Ac,m+1.
Definition 3.9 (BPPBQNCd). The set of languages L = {Ln : n > 0} for which there exists a family
of d-CQ schemes {An : n > 0} such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
• if x ∈ Ln, then Pr[An(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[An(x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
Let A be a d-CQ scheme with access to some oracle O. We represent AO as
(L(1))O c−→ (L(2))O c−→ · · · c−→ (L(m−1))O c−→ (A(m)c )O (6)
where (L(i))O := (Ac,i)O c−→ Π0/1 ◦ (U (d)OU (d−1) · · · OU (1)). We illustrate the scheme as in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8: The d-CQ scheme with access to an oracle O
Definition 3.10 ((BPPBQNCd)O). The set of languages LO = {LOn : n > 0} for which there exists
a family of d-CQ schemes {AOn : n > 0} such that for n > 0, for any x where |x| = n,
• if x ∈ LOn , then Pr[AOn (x) = 1] ≥ 2/3;
• otherwise, Pr[AOn (x) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
We define BPPBQNC as a set of languages which can be decided by a family of d-CQ schemes
with d = O(polylog n).
The main differences between d-CQ and d-QC schemes are that 1) the d-QC scheme can transmit
quantum messages from one layer to the next, but the d-CQ scheme can only send classical messages,
and 2) a d-QC scheme has at most d layers, but a d-CQ scheme may have m× d layers. According
to these observations, these two schemes seem to be incomparable.
The notations BQNCBPP and BPPBQNC may not be standard in quantum complexity theory.
For instance, one may expect the quantum circuit can make superposed queries, but we only allow
classical queries. The reason we chose these non-standard names is that BPPBQNC and BQNCBPP
are more intuitive for readers to capture the ideas of the two models and can help readers to figure
out the differences between these two models as we have mentioned in the previous paragraph.
4 The d-shuffling Simon’s Problem (d-SSP)
In this section, we define the oracle and the corresponding oracle problem which separates the
general quantum algorithms from d-QC and d-CQ schemes. We call the oracle the shuffling oracle
and the corresponding problem as the d-shuffling Simon’s problem (d-SSP).
4.1 The Shuffling Oracle
For X and Y any two sets, we let P (X,Y ) be the set of one-to-one functions from X to Y . For
example, P(Zn2 ,Zn2 ) is the set of all permutations over Zn2 . Let f : Zn2 → Zn2 be an arbitrary function
and d ∈ N. We define the d-depth shuffling of f as below.
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Definition 4.1 ((d, f)-Shuffling). A (d, f)-shuffling of f is defined by F := (f0, . . . , fd), where
f0, . . . , fd−1 ∈ P (Z(d+2)n2 ,Z(d+2)n2 ) are chosen randomly, and then we choose fd be the function
satisfying the following properties: Let Sd := {fd−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x′) : x′ = 0, . . . , 2n − 1}.
• For x ∈ Sd, let fd−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x′) = x, and we choose the function fd : Sd → [0, 2n − 1]
satisfying that fd ◦ fd−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x′) = f(x′).
• For x /∈ Sd, we let fd(x) = ⊥.
We let SHUF(d, f) be the set of all (d, f)-shuffling functions of f . For simplicity, we denote fd
on the subdomain Sd as f
∗
d .
In this paper, we consider the case that the (d, f)-shuffling is given randomly. One of the most
natural way is sampling a shuffling function F uniformly at random from SHUF(d, f). We describe
the sampling procedure as below.
Definition 4.2 (D(f, d)). Draw f0, . . . , fd−1 uniformly at random from P(Z(d+2)n2 ,Z(d+2)n2 ) and
then choose f∗d such that f
∗
d ◦ · · · ◦ f0(x) = f(x) for x ∈ Zn2 .
Fix d ∈ N and a function f : Zn2 → Zn2 , we can define a random oracle which is a (d, f)-shuffling
chosen uniformly randomly from SHUF(d, f).
Definition 4.3 (Shuffling oracle Of,dunif). Let f be an arbitrary function from Zn2 to Zn2 . Let d ∈ N.
We define the shuffling oracle Of,dunif as a (d, f)-shuffling F chosen from SHUF(d, f) according to
D(f, d).
If we sample F according to the distribution in Def. 4.2, only f∗d encodes the information of f ,
while (f0, . . . , fd−1) are just random one-to-one functions. We call f∗d the core function of f .
For simplifying our proofs, we here define paths in the shuffling oracle. The concept of paths
will be used when we consider d-QC and d-CQ schemes.
Definition 4.4 (Path in Of,dunif). Let F ∈ SHUF(d, f). we say (x0, . . . , xd+1) is a path in F if
fi(xi) = xi+1 for i = 0, . . . , d.
Now, we describe the oracle access to the shuffling oracle Of,dunif . Let |φ〉 be the input state to
Of,dunif , which we represent in the form
|φ〉 :=
∑
X0,...,Xd
c(X0, . . . ,Xd)
(
d⊗
i=0
|i,Xi〉
)
RQ
⊗ |0〉RN ⊗ |w(X0, . . . ,Xd)〉RW , (7)
where |w(X0, . . . ,Xd)〉’s are some arbitrary states and Xi is a set of elements in the domain of fi.
The queries in the register RQ and the ancillary qubits in the register RN will be processed by the
oracle, while the remaining local working qubits in the register RW are unchanged and hold by the
algorithm; the state |i,Xi〉 denotes the set of parallel queries to function fi.
We let F ∈ SHUF(d, f) be sampled according to D(f, d), then
F|φ〉 :=
(
d⊗
i=0
|i,Xi〉|fi(Xi)〉
)
RQ,RN
⊗ |w(X0, . . . ,Xd)〉RW .
Applying Of,dunif on |φ〉 gives the mixed state
Of,dunif(|φ〉〈φ|) :=
∑
F∈SHUF(d,f)
1
|SHUF(d, f)|F|φ〉〈φ|F .
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4.2 Shuffling Simon’s Problem
We recall the definitions of Simon’s function and Simon’s problem.
Definition 4.5 (Simon’s function). A two-to-one function f : Zn2 → Zn2 for n ∈ N is a Simon’s
function if there exists an s ∈ Zn2 such that f(x) = f(x+ s) for x ∈ Zn2 .
Definition 4.6 (Simon’s problem ). Let n ∈ N. Let F be the set of all Simon’s functions from Zn2
to Zn2 . Choose f from F uniformly at random, the problem is to find the hidden shift s of f .
The decision version of Simon’s problem is as follows:
Definition 4.7 (Decision Simon’s problem). Let n ∈ N. Let F be the set of all Simon’s functions
from Zn2 to Zn2 . Choose f to be either a random Simon’s function from F or a random one-to-one
function from Zn2 to Zn2 with equal probability, the problem is to decide which case f is.
Both problems have been shown to be hard classically and can be solved in quantum polynomial
time. We define the d-SSP by combining Simon’s problem and the shuffling oracle.
Definition 4.8 (d-Shuffling Simon’s Problem (d-SSP)). Let d ∈ N. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a
random Simon’s function or a random one-to-one function with equal probability. Given access to
the (d, f)-shuffling oracle Of,dunif of f , the problem is to decide which case f is.
The search version of the d-SSP is as follows:
Definition 4.9 (Search d-SSP). Let d ∈ N. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a random Simon’s function.
Given access to the (d, f)-shuffling oracle Of,dunif of f , the problem is to find the hidden shift of f .
Then, we define an oracle O and a language L(O) corresponding to the d-SSP.
Definition 4.10. Let {fi : Zi2 → Zi2; i > 0} be the set of functions satisfying the promise of the
decision Simon’s problem. Let O := {Ofi,d(i)unif : i > 0}, where Ofi,d(i)unif is the (d(i), fi)-shuffling oracle
for the function fi and d(i) = i. The language is defined as follows:
L(O) := {1n : fn is a Simon’s function.}
Remark 1. If the d-SSP is intractable for any d-CQ or d-QC scheme for any d, then
L(O) /∈ (BPPBQNC)O ∪ (BQNCBPP)O.
This is because d(n) = Θ(n) is asymptotically greater than logk n for any constant k. We can prove
it by contradiction. If there is a d-CQ or d-QC algorithm can decide L(O), then we can use that
algorithm to solve the d-SSP.
We can show that the d-SSP can be solved with a 2d + 1-depth quantum circuit. The idea is
using Simon’s algorithm and erasing the queries on the path.
Theorem 4.11. The d-SSP and the search d-SSP can be solved by a QNC2d+1 circuit with classical
post-processing.
15
Proof. The d-SSP can be solved via Simon’s algorithm. We show the proof here.∑
x∈Zn2
|x〉|0, . . . , 0〉 f0∼Df−−−−→
∑
x∈Zn2
|x〉|f0(x), . . . , 0〉
f1∼Df−−−−→
∑
x∈Zn2
|x〉|f0(x), f1(f0(x)), . . . , 0〉
fd∼Df−−−−→
∑
x∈Zn2
|x〉|f0(x), f1(f0(x)), . . . , f(x)〉
Measure−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|x〉|f0(x), . . . , fd−1(· · · f0(x))〉
+|x+ s〉|f0(x+ s), . . . , fd−1(· · · f0(x+ s))〉)|f(x)〉
uncompute f0,...,fd−1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|x〉+ |x+ s〉) |f(x)〉
QFT−−−→ 1√
2n
∑
j∈Zn2
((−1)x·j + (−1)(x+s)j)|j〉.
When s · j = 0, measuring the first register outputs j with non-zero probability. Other other hand,
when s · j = 1, the probability that measurement outputs j is zero. Therefore, by sampling O(n)
copies of j’s, one can find s which is orthogonal to all j’s with high probability.
Theorem 4.11 directly implies that the language defined in Def. 4.10 is in BQP relative to O.
5 Analyzing the Shuffling Oracle
In this section, we are going to prove some properties related to the shuffling oracle. We first define
as sequence of subsets which are in the domains of f0, . . . , fd.
Definition 5.1 (S). Let S0 = {0, . . . , 2n − 1}. For j = 1, . . . , d, let Sj+1 = fj ◦ fj−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f0(S0).
We define S := (S0, . . . , Sd).
We define a sequence of hidden sets S corresponding to the shuffling oracle.
Definition 5.2 (The hidden sets S). Let d, n ∈ N, f : Zn2 → Zn2 , and F be a (d, f)-shuffling of f .
Then, we define the sequence of hidden sets S = (S
(0)
, . . . , S
(d)
) as follows.
1. Let S
(0)
j = Z
(d+2)n
2 for j = 0, . . . , d. We define S
(0)
= (S
(0)
0 , . . . , S
(0)
d ).
2. For ` = 1, . . . , d, for j = `, . . . , d, we choose S
(`)
j ⊆ S(`−1)j randomly satisfying that
|S(`)j |
|S(`−1)j |
≤
1
2n , fj(S
(`)
j−1) = S
(`)
j , and Sj ⊆ S(`)j . We define S
(`)
= (S
(`)
` , . . . , S
(`)
d ).
Note that S is a concept which we will use to show that a d-depth quantum circuit cannot
successfully evaluate f∗d with high probability. Hence, we will choose S in the ways such that some
properties are satisfied depending on the computational models we are considering. We will see
how to construct S in the following sections.
With the concept of S, we can introduce the notation Shadow which we will use to analyze the
shuffling oracle.
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Definition 5.3 (Shadow function). Let F := (f0, . . . , fd) be a (d, f)-shuffling of f : Zn2 → Zn2 . Fix
the hidden sets S := (S
(0)
, . . . , S
(d)
). The shadow G of F in S(`) = (S(`)` , . . . , S(`)d ) is as follows:
For j = `, . . . , d, let gj be the function such that if x ∈ S(`)j , gj(x) = ⊥; otherwise, gj(x) = fj(x).
We let G := (f0, . . . , f`−1, g`, . . . , gd).
We can also represent a (d, f)-shuffling F in terms of mappings corresponding to elements in
S
(`)
of S.
Definition 5.4 (F (`) and F (`)). For ` = 1, . . . , d, we let f (`)j be fj on S(`−1)j \ S(`)j and fˆ (`)j be fj
on S
(`)
j . Then, we define
F (1) := (f0, f (1)1 , . . . , f (1)d ) F (d+1) := (fˆ (d)d ), and
F (`) := (fˆ (`)`−1, f (`)` , . . . , f (`)d )
for ` = 2, . . . , d. Also, we define
Fˆ (0) := (f0, . . . , fd) and
Fˆ (`) := (fˆ (`)` , . . . , fˆ (`)d )
for ` = 1, . . . , d.
We can say that Fˆ (`) is the mapping of elements in S(`), and F (1), . . . ,F (`) are the mappings
out of S
(`)
for ` ∈ [d].
We rewrite F in the following form
F := (F (1), . . . ,F (d+1)).
This representation will be convenient for our analysis. There are several facts corresponding to
this representation.
Observation 1. Let F be an uniform (d, f)-shuffling of some function f .
• The key function f∗d is in F (d+1) := (fˆ (d)d ).
• Let G := (f1, . . . , f`−1, g`, . . . , gd) be the shadow of F in S(`), G must be consistent with F on
F (1), . . . ,F (`), and maps the elements in S(`) to ⊥. In other words, Fˆ (`) is totally blocked by
⊥ when given G.
• For ` = 1, . . . , d, conditioned on F (1), . . . ,F (`), the function fˆ (`)j is still drawn uniformly
randomly from P(S(`)j , S(`)j+1) for j = `, . . . , d− 1 according to the definition of D(f, d).
Remark 2. In this work, we will say a quantum state ρ or a classical bit string s¯ is uncorrelated
to F (`). This means that if we replace F (`) by any other function, the process which outputs ρ or s¯
will not change the output distribution. On the other hand, if a quantum state ρ or a bit string s¯
is correlated to F (`), then we will assume a process which is given ρ (or s¯) knows everything about
F (`) without loss of generality.
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5.1 Semi-classical Shuffling Oracle
In this section, we are going to combine the concepts of “semi-classical” oracle introduced in [AHU18]
and the shuffling oracle together.
Definition 5.5 (UF\S
(`)
). Let f be an arbitrary function and F be a random (d, f)-shuffling of
f . Let S := (S
(0)
, . . . , S
(d)
) be a sequence of hidden sets. Let U be single-depth quantum circuit.
For ` ∈ [d], we define UF\S(`) to be an unitary operating on registers (R, I) where I is a single-qubit
register. UF\S
(`)
simulates FU and that:
Before applying F , UF\S(`) first applies U
S
(`) on (R, I) and then performs F . Here U
S
(`) is
defined by:
U
S
(`) |(`,X`), . . . , (d,Xd)〉R|b〉I :=
{
U
S
(`) |(`,X`), . . . , (d,Xd)〉|b〉 if every Xi ∩ S(`)i = φ,
U
S
(`) |(`,X`), . . . , (d,Xd)〉|b+ 1 mod 2〉 otherwise.
In other words, for any state |ψ〉R,I,
UF\S
(`) |ψ〉 := FU
S
(`)U |ψ〉
In the following, we define a quantity which is the probability that the parallel queries are in a
particular hidden set S
(`)
.
Definition 5.6 (Pr(find S
(k+1)
: UF\S
(k+1)
, ρ)). Let k, d ∈ N and k+1 < d. Let U be a single-depth
quantum circuit and ρ be any input state. We define
Pr[find S
(k+1)
: UF\S
(k+1)
, ρ] := E
[
Tr
(
(IR ⊗ (I − |0〉〈0|))I ◦ UF\S
(k+1) ◦ ρ
)]
.
Following Def. 5.6, we let |ψ〉 be a pure state and U be a single-depth quantum circuit. Then,
UF\S
(`) |ψ〉R|0〉I := |φ0〉R|0〉I + |φ1〉R|1〉I
and Pr[find S
(`)
: UF\S
(`)
, |ψ〉] = E[‖|φ1〉R‖2]. Note that |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are orthogonal by the fact
that |φ0〉 involves no query to S(`) but |ψ1〉 does. Therefore,
FU |ψ〉 = |φ0〉+ |φ1〉.
5.2 Oneway-to-hiding (O2H) lemma for the shuffling oracle
Here, we extend the Oneway-to-hiding lemma (O2H lemma) by Ambainis et al. [AHU18] to the
shuffling oracle. Briefly, the O2H lemma shows that for any two functions g and h, the probability
for a quantum algorithm to distinguish them is bounded by the probability that the quantum
algorithm ever ”find” an element in the input domain that g and h disagree with each other times
the depth of the quantum algorithm.
Lemma 5.7 (O2H lemma for the shuffling oracle). Let k, d ∈ N satisfying that k < d. Let U be
any single depth quantum circuit and ρ be any input state. Let f be any function from Zn2 to Zn2 .
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Let F be a random (d, f)-shuffling of f . Let S := (S(0), . . . , S(d)) be a sequence of random hidden
sets as defined in Def. 5.2. Let G be the shadow of F in S(k). Then, for any binary string t,
|Pr[Π0/1 ◦ FU(ρ) = t]− Pr[Π0/1 ◦ GU(ρ) = t]| ≤ B(FU(ρ),GU(ρ))
≤
√
2 Pr[find S
(k)
: UF\S
(k)
, ρ],
where Π0/1 is the measurement in the standard basis. Here the probability is over F , S, and the
randomness of the quantum mechanism.
Proof. We will prove the case where the initial state is a pure state and then the general case directly
follows from the concavity of the mixed state. For simplicity, we denote Pr[find S
(k)
: UF\S
(k)
, ρ]
as Pfind.
Fix F and S(k). We let |ψ〉 be any initial state and
FU
S
(k)U |ψ〉R|0〉I := |φ0〉R|0〉I + |φ1〉R|1〉I,
where |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are two unnormalized states. |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are orthogonal due to the fact that
all queries |φ0〉 consists of are not in S(k), while the queries |φ1〉 performs are elements in US(k) .
This, therefore, implies that
|ψf 〉 := FU |ψ〉 = |φ0〉+ |φ1〉 and
Similarly, we let
GUU
S
(k) |ψ〉R|0〉I := |φ0〉R|0〉I + |φ⊥1 〉R|1〉I,
and due to the same fact that |φ0〉 and |φ⊥1 〉 are orthogonal, we have that
|ψg〉 := GU |ψ〉 = |φ0〉+ |φ⊥1 〉.
Here, |φ⊥1 〉 and |φ1〉 are orthogonal since G maps all elements in S(k) to ⊥.
Let Pfind(F , S(k)) be the probability that a standard-basis measurement in the register I of
FU
S
(k)U |ψ〉R|0〉I returns 1, which is equal to ‖|φ1〉‖2. Consider the two-norm distance between
|ψf 〉 and |ψg〉,
‖|ψf 〉 − |ψg〉‖2 = ‖|φ1〉 − |φ⊥1 〉‖2
= ‖|φ1〉‖2 + ‖|φ⊥1 〉‖2
≤ 2‖|φ1〉‖2 = 2Pfind(F , S(k)).
The second equality follows from the fact that |φ1〉 and |φ⊥1 〉 are orthogonal. The inequality is
because that ‖|φ1〉‖2 = ‖|φ⊥1 〉‖2 = 1− ‖|φ0〉‖2.
Then, consider the case that S
(k)
and F are random. The output states of FU and GU becomes
ρf :=
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]|ψf 〉〈ψf |, and
ρg :=
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]|ψg〉〈ψg|.
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Consider the fidelity of these two mixed states.
F (ρf , ρg) = F
 ∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]|ψf 〉〈ψf |,
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]|ψg〉〈ψg|

≥
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]F (|ψf 〉〈ψf |, |ψg〉〈ψg|)
≥ 1− 1
2
·
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]‖|ψf 〉 − |ψg〉‖2
≥ 1− 1
2
·
∑
F ,S(k)
Pr[F ∧ S(k)]2Pfind(F , S(k)).
≥ 1− Pfind.
Then,
B(ρf , ρg) =
√
2− 2F (ρf , ρg)
≤
√
2− 2(1− Pfind) =
√
2Pfind.
Finally, by Lemma 3.3,
|Pr[Π0/1 ◦ FU(ρ) = t]− Pr[Π0/1 ◦ GU(ρ) = t]| ≤
√
2Pfind.
5.3 Bounding the finding probability
As we have just shown that the probability of distinguishing F and its shadow can be bounded by
the probability of finding the “shadow”. Then, we would like to show how to bound the finding
probability.
Follow the previous section, we let F be a random (d, f)-shuffling of f and S := (S(0), . . . , S(d))
be a sequence of random hidden sets as defined in Definition 5.2 (which could be chosen according
to arbitrary distribution). We show that the finding probability of S
(k)
is bounded.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose Pr[x ∈ S(k)i |x ∈ S(k−1)i ] ≤ p for i = k, . . . , d. Then for any single-depth
quantum circuit U and initial state ρ, which are promised to be uncorrelated to Fˆ (k−1) and S(k),¶
Pr[find S
(k)
: UF\S
(k)
, ρ] ≤ q · p,
where q is the number of queries U performs.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the case where ρ is a pure state. Let |ψ〉 be the initial state and be
promised to be uncorrelated to Fˆ (k−1). We represent FU
S
(k)U |ψ〉 as
∑
X0,...,Xd
c(X0, . . . ,Xd)
(
d⊗
i=0
|i,Xi, fi(Xi)〉
)
|w(X0, . . . ,Xd)〉|b(X1, . . . ,Xd)〉I
¶Here, ρ and U can be arbitrarily correlated to F (1), . . . ,F (k−1), and F and S(k)can be sampled arbitrarily.
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where b(X1, . . . ,Xd) = 1 if there exists i ∈ [`, d] such that Xi∩S(k)i 6= {φ}; otherwise, b(X1, . . . ,Xd) =
0. We can assume all queries are in S
(k−1)
without loss of generality. Since both U and |ψ〉 are
uncorrelated to S
(k)
, the probability that b(X1, . . . ,Xd) = 1 is at most p · (
∑d
i=k |Xi|) for all
X1, . . . ,Xd by union bound. Therefore,
Pr[find S
(k)
: UF\S
(k)
, |ψ〉]
= E
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
X0,...,Xd:b(X0,...,Xd)=1
c(X0, . . . ,Xd)
(
d⊗
i=0
|i,Xi, fi(Xi)〉
)
|w(X0, . . . ,Xd)〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∑
X0,...,Xd:b(X0,...,Xd)=1
|c(X0, . . . ,Xd)|2 · Pr[
d∨
i=k
(Xi ∩ S(k)i 6= {φ})]
≤ q · p
for q the number of queries U performs. The second equality follows from the fact that for different
set of queries, |i,Xi, fi(Xi)〉’s are orthogonal. The last inequality follows from the union bound.
6 The d-SSP is hard for QNCd
We start from showing that the d-SSP is intractable for any QNCd circuit as a warm-up. We first
prove the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 6.1. Let n, d ∈ N. Let (A, ρ) be any d-depth quantum circuit and initial state. Let f be
a random Simon’s function from Zn2 to Zn2 with hidden shift s. Give A the access to the shuffling
oracle Of,dunif . Let F be the (d, f)-shuffling sampled from Of,dunif , then
Pr[AF (ρ) = s] ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
+
1
2n
.
Proof. We choose S = (S
(0)
, . . . , S
(d)
) according to Procedure 1 and represent F in form (F (1), . . . ,F (d+1))
regarding to S. Let G` be the shadow function of F in S(`) for ` ∈ [d]. We define
AG := Ud+1GdUd · · · G1U1.
Then, for any initial state ρ0 which is uncorrelated to F ,
|Pr[AF (ρ0) = s]− Pr[AG(ρ0) = s]|
= |Pr[Ud+1FUd · · · FU1(ρ0) = s]− Pr[Ud+1GdUd · · · G1U1(ρ0) = s]|
≤ |Pr[Ud+1FUd · · · FU2FU1(ρ0) = s]− Pr[Ud+1FUd · · · FU2G1U1(ρ0) = s]|
+|Pr[Ud+1FUd · · · FU2G1U1(ρ0) = s]− Pr[Ud+1GdUd · · · G2U2G1U1(ρ0) = s]|
≤
d∑
i=1
B(FUi(ρi−1), ρi)
≤
d∑
i=1
√
2 Pr[find S
(i)
: U
F\S(i)
i , ρi−1]
where ρi := GiUiρi−1U †i G†i for i ≥ 1.
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Procedure 1 The hidden sets for QNCd
Let d, n ∈ N and f a random Simon’s problem from Zn2 → Zn2 . Consider F ∼ D(f, d), we
construct S as follows:
• Let ~S(0) := (S(0)0 , . . . , S(0)d ), where S(0)j := Z(d+2)n2 for j = 0, . . . , d.
• For ` = 1, . . . , d,
1. let S
(`)
` be a subset chosen uniformly at random with the promise that
|S(`)` |/|S(`−1)` | = 12n and S` ⊂ S
(`)
` ;
2. for j = `+ 1, . . . , d, let S
(`)
j := {fj−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f`(S(`)` )};
3. let S
(`)
:= (S
(`)
` , . . . , S
(`)
d ).
• We then let S := (S(0), . . . , S(d)).
It is not hard to see that Pr[AG(ρ0) = s] is at most 12n . This follows from the fact that G1, . . . ,Gd
does not contain information of f∗d and therefore AG(ρ0) can do no better than guess. The rest to
show is that Pr[find S
(i)
: U
F\S(i)
i , ρi−1] is at most
poly(n)
2n for all i ∈ [d]. To prove it, we show that
Pr[x ∈ S(`)j |x ∈ S(`−1)j ] = 12n for ` = 1, . . . , d and j = `, . . . , d. We prove it by induction on `.
For the base case ` = 1, for all j ∈ [d], and x ∈ S(0)j ,
Pr[x ∈ S(1)j ] = Pr[x ∈ Sj ] Pr[x ∈ S(1)j |x ∈ Sj ] + Pr[x /∈ Sj ] Pr[x ∈ S(1)j |x /∈ Sj ]
= Pr[x ∈ Sj ] + (1− Pr[x ∈ Sj ]) Pr[x ∈ S(1)j |x /∈ Sj ]
=
1
2(d+1)n
+ (1− 1
2(d+1)n
)
2(d+1)n − 2n
2(d+2)n − 2n =
1
2n
.
The second equality is because that x ∈ Sj implies x ∈ S(1)j and the third inequality follows from
the fact that f0, . . . , fd−1 are uniformly random one-to-one functions.
Suppose that the randomness holds for ` = k. Note that ρk could be correlated to F (1), . . . ,F (k),
and therefore, we assume F (1), . . . ,F (k) are given to A without loss of generality as in Remark 2.
Then, given F (1), . . . ,F (k), for j ≥ k + 1 and x ∈ S(k)j
Pr[x ∈ S(k+1)j ] = Pr[x ∈ Sj ] Pr[x ∈ S(k)j |x ∈ Sj ]
+ Pr[x /∈ Sj ] Pr[x ∈ S(k)j |x /∈ Sj ]
= Pr[x ∈ Sj ] + (1− Pr[x ∈ Sj ]) Pr[x ∈ S(k)j |x /∈ Sj ]
=
2n
2(d+2−k)n
+ (1− 2
n
2(d+2−k)n
)
2(d+1−k)n − 2n
2(d+2−k)n − 2n
=
1
2n
.
The second last equality follows from the fact that given F (1), . . . ,F (k), fˆ (k)j is still an uniformly
random one-to-one function for j = k, . . . , d− 1.
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Finally, Ui and ρi−1 are uncorrelated to Fˆ (i). By Lemma 5.8, Pr[find S(i) : UF\S
(i)
i , ρi−1] is at
most qi · 12n where qi is the number of queries Ui performs. Therefore,
|Pr[AF (ρ0) = s]− Pr[AG(ρ0) = s]|
≤
d∑
i=1
√
2 Pr[find S
(i)
: U
F\S(i)
i , ρi−1]
≤
d∑
i=1
√
2qi
2n
= d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Theorem 6.1 shows that the search d-SSP is hard for any QNCd circuit. By following the same
proof, we can show that for any QNCd circuit, the d-SSP is also hard.
Theorem 6.2. The d-SSP cannot be decided by any QNCd circuit with probability greater than
1
2 + d ·
√
poly(n)
2n .
Proof. We also consider the same shadow G in the proof of Theorem 6.1. Following that proof, for
any ρ and A,
|Pr[AF (ρ0) = 0]− Pr[AG(ρ0) = 0]| ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Then, the rest to check is that AG cannot solve the d-SSP with high probability. Similar to the case
of the search d-SSP, since G1, . . . ,Gd have the core function f∗d be blocked, AG has no information
about f and thus cannot do better than guess. This implies that Pr[AF (ρ0) = 0] ≤ 12 +d·
√
poly(n)
2n <
2/3.
Therefore, the language defined in Def. 4.10 is also hard for QNC circuit.
Corollary 6.3. Let O and L(O) be defined as in Def. 4.10. L(O) /∈ BQNCO
7 The d-SSP is hard for d-QC scheme
The main theorem we are going to show in this section is that the search d-SSP is hard for all d-QC
scheme.
Theorem 7.1. Let d, n ∈ N. For any d-QC scheme A and initial state ρ, let f be a random
Simon’s function from ZN2 to Zn2 with hidden shift s, and F ∼ D(f, d), then
Pr[AF (ρ) = s] ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Before proving Theorem 7.1, we first recall the classical lower bound for the Simon’s problem.
However, for the purpose of
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Lemma 7.2. Let Ac be any PPT algorithm. Let f : Zn2 → Zn2 be a uniformly random Simon
function. Let q ∈ N be the number of queries Ac performs, and S ⊂ Zn be the set where f(x) is
known for x ∈ S and f(x) 6= f(x′) for x 6= x′. Then the probability that Afc (S, f(S)) outputs the
hidden shift correctly is at most
(q + 1 + |S|)2
2n+1 − (q + 1 + |S|)2 ,
which is O(poly(n)/2n) when q and |S| are polynomial in n.
Proof. We only need to consider the case where Ac is a deterministic algorithm. A probabilistic
algorithm can be seen as a convex combination of deterministic algorithm; therefore, the success
probability of a probabilistic algorithm must be an average over deterministic algorithms.
Let S ⊂ Zn2 and f(x) 6= f(y) for x, y ∈ S and x 6= y. The probability that Ac finds a collision is
Pr[collision : Afc (S)] ≤
q∑
i=1
i+ |S| − 1
2n − (i+ |S|)2/2 ≤
(q + |S|)2
2n+1 − (q + |S|)2 .
For any algorithm which can find s with probability p by performing q queries, it can find a
collision with the same probability by performing q+1 queries. The probability of finding a collision
by using q + 1 queries is at most (q+|S|+1)
2
2n+1−(q+|S|+1)2 . Therefore,
Pr[Afc (S) = s] ≤
(q + |S|+ 1)2
2n+1 − (q + |S|+ 1)2 .
7.1 Proof of Theorem 7.1
Recall that we can represent a d-QC scheme A with access to F ∼ D(f, d) as
AFc ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ FUd ◦ AFc ) ◦ · · · ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ FU1 ◦ AFc ).
We denote Π0/1 ◦ FUi ◦ AFc as LFi for i = 1, . . . , d and rewrite the representation above as AFc ◦
LFd ◦ · · · ◦LF1 . We let qi be the number of quantum queries and ri be the number of classical queries
the algorithm performs in Li. We let q :=
∑d
i=1 qi and r :=
∑d
i=1 ri.
For the ease of the analysis, we allow Ac to learn the whole path from f0 to fd by just one query,
which we called the “path query”. It is worth noting that Ac that can make path queries can be
simulated by the original model. This follows from the fact that the original model can achieve the
same thing by using d times as many queries as Ac.
To prove the theorem, we need to define an S which has property that Pr[x ∈ S(`)j ] ≤ p
as described in Lemma 5.8 for some p that is small enough. In the following, we show that
S = (S
(1)
, . . . , S
(d)
) in Procedure 2 satisfies this property with p = 12n .
Claim 7.3. Let d, n ∈ N. Let ` ∈ [d]. Let Ac be any randomized algorithm. Let f : Zn2 → Zn2 be
any function. Let F ∼ D(f, d). Let S(1), . . . , S(`) and T (1), . . . , T (`) be be defined as in Procedure 2
regarding to Ac. Given (F (1), . . . ,F (`−1)) and (T (1), . . . , T (`)), then
Pr
F ,S
[x ∈ S(`)j |x ∈ S(`−1)j \ T (`)j ] =
1
2n
for j = `, . . . , d.
24
Proof. We prove it via induction on the depth of F . For the base case where ` = 1, given T (1) and
fj on T
(1)
j for j = 1, . . . , d, for all i ∈ [d] and xi ∈ S(0)i \ T (1)i ,
Pr[xi ∈ S(1)i ] = Pr[xi ∈ Si \ T (1)i ] + Pr[xi ∈ S(1)i \ Si]
=
2n − |T (1)i |
2(d+2)n − |T (1)i |
+
|S(1)i | − 2n + |T (1)i |
2(d+2)n − |T (1)i |
=
|S(1)i |
2(d+2)n − |T (1)i |
=
1
2n
.
We now suppose that when ` = k − 1, given F (1), . . . ,F (k−2) and T (1), . . . , T (k−1),
Pr[x ∈ S(k−1)i |x ∈ S(k−2)i \ T k−1i ] =
1
2n
for i = k − 1, . . . , d.
Then, for ` = k, given F (1), . . . ,F (k−1) and T (1), . . . , T (k), for i = k, . . . , d and x ∈ S(k−1)i \T (k)i ,
Pr[x ∈ S(k)i ] = Pr[x ∈ Si \ (∪km=1(T (m)i ))] + Pr[x ∈ S(k)i \ Si]
=
2n −∑km=1 |T (m)i |
|S(k−1)i | − |T (k)i |
+
|S(k)i | − 2n +
∑k
m=1 |T (m)i |
|S(k−1)i | − |T (k)i |
=
1
2n
.
Procedure 2 The hidden sets for d-QC scheme
Let d, n ∈ N and f a random Simon’s problem from Zn2 → Zn2 . Given F ∼ D(f, d) and A a
d-QC scheme, We construct S as follows:
• Let ~S(0) := (S(0)0 , . . . , S(0)d ), where S(0)j := Z(d+2)n2 for j = 0, . . . , d.
• For ` = 1, . . . , d:
1. After the `-th AFc is applied, let T (`) = (T (`)` , . . . , T (`)d ) be the set of points the `-th
AFc queried. As we have mentioned before, we allow Ac to query the whole path by
one query. Hence, fj(T
(`)
j ) = T
(`)
j+1 for j = `, . . . , d.
2. Let W
(`−1)
` := S
(`−1)
` \ T (`)` . Then, we choose S(`)` uniformly randomly from W (`−1)`
with the promise that |S(`)` |/|W (`−1)` | = 1/2n and S` \ (T (1)` ∪ · · · ∪ T (`)` ) ⊂ S(`)` .
3. For j = `+ 1, . . . , d, let S
(`)
j := {fj−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f`(S(`)` )}.
4. Let S
(`)
= (S
(`)
` , . . . , S
(`)
d ).
• S := (S(0), . . . , S(d))
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 7.1.
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Proof of Theorem 7.1. We choose the hidden set S = (S
(0)
, . . . , S
(d)
) according to Procedure 2. In
the procedure, we choose S
(`)
after theAc in L` has performed. We represent F as (F (1), . . . ,F (d+1))
according to S. Let G` be the shadow of F in S(`) for ` ∈ [d]. We define
AG := AFc ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ GdUd ◦ AFc ) ◦ · · · ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ G1U1 ◦ AFc )
:= AFc ◦ LGdd ◦ · · · ◦ LG11 .
AG succeeds to output the hidden shift with probability at most (r+1)2
2n−(r+1)2 , where r is the number
of queries the classical algorithms perform. Note that the outputs of U1, . . . , Ud are uncorrelated to
Fˆ (d). This fact implies that given the measurement outcomes of the i-th layer quantum unitaries,
Ac can only learn information about F (1), . . . ,F (d). This does not give Ac more information about
f . Therefore, Ac at Li succeeds with probability at most (
∑i+1
j=1 rj+1)
2
2n−(∑i+1j=1 rj+1)2 and AG succeeds with
probability at most poly(n)2n .
Let ρ0 be the initial state and ρi be the output state of (L
Gi
i ◦ · · · ◦LG11 )(ρ0) for i = 1, . . . , d, we
can show that
|Pr[AF (ρ0) = s]− Pr[AG(ρ0) = s]|
≤ |Pr[AF (ρ0) = s]− Pr[(Ld ◦ · · · ◦ L2)F (LG1 (ρ0)) = s]|+
|Pr[(Ld ◦ · · · ◦ L2)F (LG1 (ρ0)) = s]− Pr[(Ld ◦ · · · ◦ L2)G(LG1 (ρ0)) = s]|
≤ B(LF1 (ρ0), LG1 (ρ0)) +
|Pr[(Ld ◦ · · · ◦ L2)F (ρ1) = s]− Pr[(Ld ◦ · · · ◦ L2)G(ρ1) = s]|
≤
d∑
i=1
B(ρi, L
F
i (ρi−1)). (8)
≤
d∑
i=1
√
2 Pr[find S
(i)
: U
F\S(i)
i , ρi−1]. (9)
Eq. 8 is by the hybrid argument and Eq. 9 is from Lemma 5.7.
Then, by Lemma 5.8 and Claim 7.3,
Pr[find S
(i)
: U
F\S(i)
i , ρi−1] ≤
qi
2n
.
This implies that
Pr[AF (ρ0) = s] ≤ poly(n)
2n
+ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
≤
√
poly(n)
2n
.
7.2 On separating the depth hierarchy of d-QC scheme
By following the same proof of Theorem 7.1, we can show that for any d-QC scheme, the d-SSP is
also hard.
Theorem 7.4. The d-SSP cannot be decided by any d-QC scheme with probability greater than
1
2 +
√
poly(n)
2n .
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Proof. We consider the same shadow G in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Following that proof, for any
ρ0 and A,
|Pr[AF (ρ0) = 1]− Pr[AG(ρ0) = 1]| ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Then, the rest to check is that AG cannot solve the d-SSP with high probability. In case that f is
a random Simon’s function, AG finds s with probability at most poly(n)2n . Therefore, Pr[AG(ρ0) = 1]
is at most 1/2 + poly(n)/2n. This implies that Pr[AF (ρ0) = 1] ≤ 12 + d ·
√
poly(n)
2n +
poly(n)
2n < 2/3.
Corollary 7.5. For any d ∈ N, there is a (2d+ 1)-QC scheme which can solve the d-SSP with high
probability, but there is no d-QC scheme which can solve the d-SSP.
Proof. This corollary follows from Theorem 7.4 and Theorem 4.11 directly.
Finally, we can conclude that
Corollary 7.6. Let O and L(O) be defined as in Def. 4.10. L(O) ∈ BQPO and L(O) /∈ (BQNCBPP)O.
Proof. Note that for each n ∈ N, Ofn,d(n)unif ∈ O has depth equal to the input size. A quantum circuit
with depth poly(n) can decide if 1n is in L(O) by solving the d-SSP by Theorem 4.11. However,
for d-QC scheme which only has quantum depth d = poly log n, it cannot decide the language by
Theorem 7.4.
8 The d-SSP is hard for d-CQ scheme
The main result we are going to show here is the following theorem.
Theorem 8.1. Let d, n ∈ N. Let A be any d-CQ scheme. Let f be a random Simon’s function
from Zn2 to Zn2 with hidden shift s. Let F ∼ D(f, d). Then
Pr[AF () = s] ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Recall that we can represent a d-CQ scheme A as
AFc,m+1 ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1 ◦ AFc,m) ◦ · · · ◦ (Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1 ◦ AFc,1)
:= AFc,m+1 ◦ LFm ◦ · · · ◦ LF1 .
The main difficulty for proving Theorem 8.1 is that LFi can send some short classical advice to the
proceeding processes, which advice can be correlated to all mappings in F . Therefore, conditioned
on the short advice, the distribution of the shuffling oracle may not be uniform enough for us to
follow the same proofs above. To deal with this difficulty, we show that given a short classical
advice, by fixing the shuffling function on a few paths, the rest paths of the shuffling oracle are still
almost-uniform.
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8.1 The presampling argument for the shuffling oracle
Here, we are going to show that for F ∼ D(f, d) and a¯ a short classical string correlated to F ,
we can approximate F|a¯ (F given a¯) by a convex combination of (p, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling
functions. In the following, we first define (p, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions and then prove the
statement.
Let X and Y be two sets of elements such that |X| = |Y |. Recall that P (X,Y ) is the set of all
one-to-one functions from X to Y .
Definition 8.2 (Random variable H ~X). Let k,N ∈ N and ~X := (X1, . . . , Xk+1) be a set of sets
with size N . Let hi be random variables distributed in P (Xi, Xi+1) for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, we
define
H ~X := (h1, . . . , hk).
H ~X is a sequence of random one-to-one functions which distribution could be arbitrary. In the
following, we introduce the distributions we will use shortly.
Definition 8.3 (Almost-uniform Shuffling). Let k,N, p′ ∈ N and 0 < δ < 1. Let ~X = (X1, . . . , Xk+1)
be a set of sets with size N . Consider H ~X = (h1, . . . , hk).
• H ~X is (1 + δ)-uniform if for all subset of paths P = (
−→
P 1, . . . ,
−→
P m) where
−→
P i = (xi,1, . . . , xi,k+1)
satisfying hj(xi,j) = xi,j+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , k,
Pr[P is in H ~X ] ≤ (1 + δ)m(
(N −m)!
N !
)k.
• H ~X is (p′, 1+δ)-uniform if there exist a set of paths P ′ with size at most p′ such that H ~X |P ′
is (1+δ)-uniform, i.e., let P ′ be fixed, then for all subset of unfixed paths P = (
−→
P 1, . . . ,
−→
P m),
Pr[P is in H ~X |P ′ is in H ~X ] ≤ (1 + δ)m(
N −m− p′)!
(N − p′)! )
k.
A convex combination of (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions can be defined by the following
formula:
H :=
T∑
t=1
ptHt,
where H1, . . . ,HT are (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions and p1, . . . , pT are the probabilities for
how much each Ht contributes to H. In out context, we will only consider convex combination of
finitely objects, i.e., T is finite. We will show in Claim 8.4 that F conditioned on some classical
advice a¯ is close to a convex combination of finitely many (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions.
Claim 8.4. Let 0 < γ, δ < 1. Let p, k,N ∈ N. Let ~X = (X1, . . . , Xk+1) be a set of sets with size
N . Let H ~X = (h1, . . . , hk) be distributed uniformly. Let P be a set of fixed paths on h1, . . . , hk
and a¯ be a p-bit advice. Let H ~X |(P, a¯) be H ~X conditioned on (P, a¯). Then, there exists a convex
combination H|(P, a¯) of (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shufflings such that
H ~X |(P, a¯) = H ~X |(P, a¯) + γ′H′
where p′ ≤ p+log(1/γ)log(1+δ) + |P |, γ′ ≤ γ and H′ is an arbitrary random shuffling.
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Proof. We let H ~X |(P, a¯) be the random variable conditioned on P and a¯. It is obvious that con-
ditioned on P , H ~X is uniform on the rest. We let P1 be the maximal set of paths satisfying
that
Pr[P1 in H ~X |(P, a¯)] ≥ (1 + δ)|P1|(
(N − |P1| − |P |)!
(N − |P |)! )
d.
Conditioned on P1, we show that H ~X is (1 + δ)-uniform by contradiction. Suppose there exists
another set of paths P ′ such that
Pr[P ′ in H ~X |(P1, P, a¯)] ≥ (1 + δ)|P
′|(
(N − |P1| − |P ′| − |P |)!
(N − P1 − |P |)! )
d.
Then,
Pr[P1 ∪ P ′ in H ~X |(P, a¯)] ≥ (1 + δ)|P
′|+|P1|(
(N − |P1| − |P ′| − |P |)!
(N − |P |)! )
d
which contradicts the maximallity of P1. This proves that conditioned on P1, H ~X |(P, a¯) is 1 + δ-
uniform.
The size of P1 is bounded as follows: Since a¯ is a p-bit advice,
Pr[P1 in H ~X |(P, a¯)] ≤ 2p(
(N − |P | − |P1|)!
(N − |P |)! )
d
which implies that |P1| ≤ plog(1+δ) .
Now, we can decompose H ~X |(P, a¯) as
Pr[P1 in H ~X |(P, a¯)] · H ~X |(P, P1, a¯) + Pr[¬P1 in H ~X |(P, a¯)] · H ~X |(P,¬P1, a¯).
Note that H ~X |(P,¬P1, a¯) may not be (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform. In case that it is not and
Pr[¬P1 in H ~X |(P, a¯)] ≥ γ,
we keep decomposing H ~X |(P,¬P1, a¯).
We then find another maximal set of paths P2 satisfying that
Pr[P1 in H ~X |(P,¬P1, a¯)] ≥ (1 + δ)|P2|(
(N − |P2| − |P |)!− |P1|
(N − |P |)!− |P1| )
d.
It is obvious that conditioned on P2,H ~X |(P,¬P1, a¯) is (1+δ)-uniform following the same calculation.
Furthermore, the size of P2 can be bounded by the inequality
(1 + δ)|P2|(
(N − |P2| − |P |)!− |P1|
(N − |P |)!− |P1| )
d ≤ 2s 1
γ
· ((N − |P2| − |P |)!− |P1|
(N − |P |)!− |P1| )
d.
This implies that |P2| ≤ p+log(1/γ)log(1+δ) .
We recursively decompose H ~X |(P, a¯) until the probability that the rest is less than γ. Then,
H ~X |(P, a¯) is γ-close to
H ~X |(a¯, P ) =
q∑
i=1
Pr[Pi|¬P1, . . . ,¬Pi−1] · H ~X |(P,¬P1, . . . ,¬Pi−1, Pi, a¯).
29
An algorithm A which has access to a convex combination of shuffling functions, e.g., H :=∑
t ptHt can be represented as
AH =
∑
t
ptAHt .
In the following, we show that if the shuffling is (p′, 1 − δ)-uniform, the probability to find the
hidden sets in the shuffling is still bounded as we need for Lemma 5.8.
Claim 8.5. Let p, k,N,N ′ ∈ N and 0 < δ < 1. Let ~X = (X1, . . . , Xk+1) be a set of sets with
each size N . Let H ~X = (h1, . . . , hk) be (p, 1 + δ)-uniform as defined in Def. 8.3 and P be the
set of p paths fixed in H ~X . We choose a N ′-element set Y1 uniformly randomly from X1, and let
Yi := h(Yi−1) for i = 2, . . . , k. Then, for j ∈ [k], for xj ∈ Xj,
Pr[xj ∈ Yj ] ≤ (1 + δ) · N
′
N − p.
Proof. It is obvious that Pr[x1 ∈ Y1] = N ′N−p since Y1 is chosen randomly uniformly from X1. For
i = 2, . . . , k, Pr[xi ∈ Yi] can be calculated as follows:
Pr[xi ∈ Yi] = Pr[
∨
Y1⊂X1
(xi ∈ (hi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ h1(Y1)) ∧ (Y1 is chosen))]
≤
∑
Y1⊂X1
Pr[Y1 is chosen] · Pr[xi ∈ (hi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ h1(Y1))|(Y1 is chosen)]
≤
∑
Y1⊂X1
Pr[Y1 is chosen]
∑
y∈Y1
Pr[hi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ h1(y) = xi|(Y1 is chosen)]
≤ (1 + δ) N
′
N − p.
The first two inequalities follow from the union bound, and the last inequality follows from the fact
that H ~X is (p, 1 + δ)-uniform.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 8.1
Following the similar idea in previous sections, we want to show that there exists a sequence of
shadows which is indistinguishable from F . However, to prove Theorem 8.1, we actually show that
there exist a “convex combinatio” of finitely many shadows, which are indistinguishable from F .
Specifically, we show that there exist a convex combination
∑T
t=1 pt(G(1)t , . . . ,G(m)t ) such that
|Pr[LFm ◦ · · · ◦ LF1 () = s]−
T∑
t=1
pt · Pr[(LG
(m)
t
m ◦ · · · ◦ LG
(1)
t
1 () = s]|
≤ md ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
We will give the details of the shadows later in Lemma 8.9.
We denote a convex combination of bit strings as
z¯ :=
T∑
t=1
ptz¯t,
30
where z¯1, . . . , z¯T are bit string, p1, . . . , pT are the probability that z¯t is sampled, and T is finite in
our context.
Let f be a random Simon’s function from Zn2 to Zn2 . Let F be the random (d, f)-shuffling of f .
In this section, s¯ will always be in the form (P, a¯), where P is a set of paths in F , and a¯ is some
bit string correlated to F . For example, a¯ could be the statement “f(0)⊕ f(1) = 1” and so on.
We say a¯ is uncorrelated to f conditioned on P if the procedure producing a¯ will not change
the output when all mappings in f∗d except for mappings in P are erased by ⊥.
In the following, we define two kinds of advice, which are ideal and semi-ideal for our analysis.
Definition 8.6 (Ideal advice). (P, a¯) is ideal if
• P does not have a collision in f ,
• |P | = poly(n),
• and the bit string a¯ is uncorrelated to f conditioned on P .
Definition 8.7 (Semi-ideal advice). (P, a¯) is semi-ideal if
• |P | = poly(n),
• and the bit string a¯ is uncorrelated to f conditioned on P .
Note that the only difference between ideal and semi-ideal advice is that the paths fixed in an
ideal advice is promised to have no collision to reveal s, while the paths in a semi-ideal advice may
have a collision.
Claim 8.8. Let A be any algorithm. Let s¯ := (P, a¯) be an ideal advice of F . Then,
Pr[A(s¯) = s] ≤ poly(n)/2n
Proof. If s¯ is ideal, then there is no collision in P , and a¯ is uncorrelated to f conditioned on
P . Given (P, a¯), A cannot distinguish whether f is a one-to-one function or a Simon function.
Therefore,
Pr[A(s¯) = s] ≤ (|P |+ 1)
2
2n − (|P |+ 1)2 ≤
poly(n)
2n
.
We consider
B := Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1 ◦ Ac, (10)
where U1, . . . , Ud are single depth quantum circuit and Ac is a PPT algorithm. As we have men-
tioned earlier, the output of BF can be represented as (P, a¯), where P is a set of paths fixed by Ac
and a¯ is corresponding to the measurement outcome of the quantum circuit.
Lemma 8.9. Let F be a (d, f)-shuffling sampled from Df,d. Let s¯ :=
∑T
u=1 p
(u)s¯(u) be a convex
combination of semi-ideal advice strings. For any B in Eq. 10, there exist {Gs¯(1) , . . . ,Gs¯(T )}, which
are convex combinations of sequences of shadows corresponding to s¯(1), . . . , s¯(T ) such that for all bit
string s¯′, for u ∈ [T ],
|Pr[BF (s¯(u)) = s¯′]− Pr[BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) = s¯′]|
≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
,
and the output of BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) is semi-ideal. Moreover, if s¯ is ideal, then the output of BGs¯(u) (s¯(u))
is also ideal with probability at least 1− poly(n)2n .
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Lemma 8.9 directly implies that
|Pr[BF (s¯) = s¯′]−
T∑
u=1
p(u) Pr[BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) = s¯′]|
≤
∑
u
p(u)|Pr[BF (s¯(u)) = s¯′]− Pr[BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) = s¯′]| ≤ d ·
√
poly(n)
2n
.
Proof of Lemma 8.9. For the ease of the analysis, we allow the classical algorithm Ac to make path
queries. We prove the lemma by mathematical induction on the quantum circuit depth.
Given s¯ := (P, a¯) which is semi-ideal, we let P0 be P and the set of paths queried by Ac, let
s¯(0) := (P0, a¯), and let p := |a¯|. Note that the main difficulty which fails the previous proofs is that
F may not be uniform conditioned on a¯. By applying Lemma 8.4, F|(s¯(0)) is γ-close to a convex
combination of (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions
F|(s¯(0)) = H
S
(0) |(s¯(0)) + γ′H′,
where H
S
(0) |(s¯(0)) is a convex combination of (p′, 1+δ)-uniform shuffling functions,H′ is an arbitrary
random shuffling, and γ′ ≤ γ. According to claim 8.4, p′ ≤ p+log(1/γ)log(1+δ) + |P0|. We will set the
parameters p′, γ, and δ shortly.
We let
H
S
(0) |(s¯(0)) :=
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · H(1)t1 ,
and ρ(0) is the initial state. Then,
FU1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) =
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · H(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) + γ′H′U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)), (11)
where H(1)1 , . . . ,H(1)T1 are (p′, 1 + δ)-uniform shuffling functions. Moreover, since a¯ is uncorrelated
to f conditioned on P0, the additional paths fixed in H(1)t1 is uncorrelated to f given P0.
Eq. 11 implies that for all z¯
|Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]
−Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU2
(
H
S
(0) |(s¯(0))
)
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]| ≤ γ, (12)
where
Ud+1F · · · FU2
(
H
S
(0) |(s¯(0))
)
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0))
=
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · Ud+1F · · · FU2
(
H(1)t1
)
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0)).
Then, we construct shadows for each H(1)t1 as follows: Let P
(1)
t1
be P0 and the set of paths H(1)t1
is fixed on in addition to P0. We construct the hidden set S
(1)
t1 based on H
(1)
t1
, P
(1)
t1
, and S
(0)
as in
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Procedure 3. Let G(1)t1 be the shadow of H
(1)
t1
in S
(1)
t1 , Then,
B(H(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)),G
(1)
t1
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0)))
≤
√
2 Pr[find S
(1)
t1 : U
H(1)t1 \S
(1)
t1
1 , ρ
(0)]
≤
√
(1 + δ)
2q1
2n
(13)
where q1 is the number of queries U1 performs. The first inequality follows from Lemma 5.7 and
the last inequality follows from Claim 8.5 and Lemma 5.8. The output of G(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) is
uncorrelated to F in S(1)t1 by following the definition of G
(1)
t1
.
Procedure 3 The hidden sets for d-CQ scheme
Given j ∈ N, S(j−1) := (S(j−1)j−1 , . . . , S(j−1)d ), Hk,j = (hj , . . . , hd), and P a set of fixed paths.
1. Let S
(j−1)
j be S
(j−1)
j except for elements on P .
2. Let S
(j)
j be a subset chosen uniformly at random with the promise that |S(j)j |/|S(j−1)j | =
1
2n , and S
(j)
j includes all elements in Sj except for elements on P .
3. For ` = j + 1, . . . , d, let S
(j)
` := {h`−1 ◦ · · · ◦ hj(S(j)j )}.
4. We let S
(j)
= (S
(j)
j , . . . , S
(j)
d ).
By combining Eq. 12 and Eq. 13, we have proven that for all z¯
|Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]
−
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU2G(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]|
≤ γ +
√
(1 + δ)
q1
2n
,
The output state of
∑T1
t1=1
pt1 · G(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) is
ρ(1) :=
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · G(1)t1 U1(ρ(0), s¯(0))
:=
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · ρ(1)t1 ,
and we let s¯(1) :=
∑T1
t1=1
pt1 s¯
(1)
t1
, where s¯
(1)
t1
:= (P
(1)
t1
, a¯).
s¯
(1)
t1
must be semi-ideal. First, a¯ is still uncorrelated to f conditioned on P
(1)
t1
because P ⊆ P (1)t1 .
By Claim 8.4, p′ ≤ p′+log 1/γlog(1+δ) . The size |P
(1)
t1
| = |P0|+p′ is at most poly(n) by setting γ = 1/ poly(n)
and δ = O(1).
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We then show that if s¯ is ideal, s¯
(1)
t1
for t1 ∈ [T1] is ideal with high probability at least 1− poly(n)2n .
Note that a¯ is uncorrelated to f conditioned on P . This implies that for all H(1)t1 ∈ HS(0) |s¯(0),
H(1)t1 can only have at most additional p′ paths be fixed in F , and these paths are uncorrelated to
f conditioned on P0. Since these paths are uncorrelated to f conditioned on P0, the probability
that P
(1)
t1
gives s is at most
(|P (1)t1 |+1)
2
2n−(|P (1)t1 |+1)2
. Therefore, the probability that s¯(1) is ideal is at least
1− poly(n)2n .
Then, we consider
Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU2(ρ(1), s¯(1)).
The formula above can be decomposed as
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 ·Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU2(ρ(1)t1 , s¯
(1)
t1
).
Note that ρ
(1)
t1
is uncorrelated to mappings in S
(1)
t1 since G
(1)
t1
has mappings in S
(1)
t1 be blocked.
This implies that conditioned on ρ
(1)
t1
, the mappings in S
(1)
t1 are still uniformly random. Therefore,
for each input (ρ
(1)
t1
, s¯
(1)
t1
), we can apply the presampling argument in Claim 8.4 again and get the
convex combination H
S
(1)
t1
|(s¯(1)t1 ) satisfying that for all z¯,
|Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1 ◦ Ud · · · FU2(ρ(1)t1 , s¯
(1)
t1
) = z¯]
−Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU2
(
H
S
(1)
t1
|(s¯(1)t1 )
)
U1(ρ
(1)
t1
, s¯
(1)
t1
) = z¯]| ≤ γ. (14)
Here, we represent the convex combination as following formula
H
S
(1)
t1
|(s¯(1)t1 ) :=
T2∑
t2=1
pt1,t2H(2)t1,t2
and then construct the shadow G(2)t1,t2 and the hidden set S
(2)
t1,t2 for each H
(2)
t1,t2
according to Proce-
dure 3. It satisfies that
B(H(2)t1,t2U2(ρ
(1)
t1
, s¯
(1)
t1
), G(2)t1,t2U2(ρ
(1)
t1
, s¯
(1)
t1
))
≤
√
2 Pr[find S
(2)
t1,t2 : U
H(2)t1,t2\S
(2)
t1,t2
1 , ρ
(0)]
≤
√
(1 + δ)
2q2
2n
, (15)
where q2 is the number of queries U2 performs. We let P
(2)
t1,t2
be P
(1)
t1
and the additional set of paths
fixed in H(2)t1,t2 . We let s¯
(2)
t1,t2
:= (a¯, P
(2)
t1,t2
).
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By Eq. 14 and Eq. 15, for all z¯,
|
T1∑
t1=1
pt1 · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F ◦ Ud ◦ · · · ◦ F ◦ U2(ρ(1)t1 , s¯
(1)
t1
) = z¯]−
T2∑
t1=1
T2∑
t2=1
pt1pt1,t2 · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · G(2)t1,t2U2(ρ
(1)
t1
, s¯
(1)
t1
) = z¯]|
≤ γ +
√
(1 + δ)
q2
2n
.
Again, we let the output state of
∑T1
t1=1
∑T2
t2=1
pt1pt1,t2 · G(2)t1,t2U2G
(1)
t1
U1 be
ρ(2) :=
T1∑
t1=1
T2∑
t2=1
pt1pt1,t2G(2)t1,t2U2G
(1)
t1
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0))
:=
T1∑
t1=1
T2∑
t2=1
pt1pt1,t2ρ
(2)
t1,t2
,
which satisfies that ρ
(2)
t1,t2
is uncorrelated the mappings in S
(2)
t1,t2 . We let
s¯(2) :=
T1∑
t1=1
T2∑
t2=1
pt1pt1,t2 s¯
(2)
t1,t2
.
Here, in case that s¯
(1)
t1
is ideal, s¯
(2)
t1,t2
is also ideal with probability at least 1− poly(n)2n via the same
analysis. Therefore, the probability that s¯
(2)
t1,t2
is ideal is at least 1− poly(n)2n . s¯
(2)
t1,t2
must be semi-ideal
since s¯
(1)
t1
is semi-ideal via the same analysis.
Now, we can suppose when the k-th parallel queries are applied, for all z¯, there exist {G(k)t1,...,tk}
and the corresponding hidden sets {S(k)t1,...,tk} such that
|
∑
t1,...,tk−1
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk−1 · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FUk(ρ(k−1)t1,...,tk−1 , s¯
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1) = z¯]−∑
t1,...,tk
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · G(k)t1,...,tkUk(ρ
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 , s¯
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1) = z¯]|
≤ γ +
√
(1 + δ)
qk
2n
. (16)
Here, ρ
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 is the output of G
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1Uk−1 · · · G
(1)
i,t1
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0)) and
s¯
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 := (a¯, P
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1),
where s¯
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 is ideal with probability at least 1−
poly(n)
2n , and ρ
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 is uncorrelated to mappings
in S
(k−1)
t1,...,tk−1 .
The output of the scheme with access to {G(k)t1,...,tk} in Eq. 16 is
ρ(k) :=
∑
t1,...,tk
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk · ρ(k)t1,...,tk
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which satisfies that ρ
(k)
t1,...,tk
is uncorrelated to the mappings in S
(k)
t1,...,tk
. We let
s¯(k) :=
∑
t1,...,tk
(pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk s¯(k)t1,...,tk ,
where s¯
(k)
t1,...,tk
:= P
(k)
t1,...,tk
, a¯) is ideal with probability at least 1− poly(n)2n .
Consider the (k + 1)-th quantum parallel queries,
Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FUk+1(ρ(k), s¯(k))
=
∑
t1,...,tk
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk ·Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FUk(ρ(k)t1,...,tk , s¯
(k)
t1,...,tk
).
Following the fact that ρ
(k)
t1,...,tk
is only correlated to mappings out of S
(k)
t1,...,tk
, we apply the
presampling argument in Claim 8.4, and there exists a convex combination
H
S
(k)
t1,...,tk
|(s¯(k)t1,...,tk) :=
∑
tk+1
pt1,...,tk+1H(k+1)t1,...,tk+1
such that for all z¯,
|
∑
t1,...,tk
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FUk+1(ρ(k)t1,...,tk , s¯
(k)
t1,...,tk
) = z¯]−
∑
t1,...,tk+1
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk+1 Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · ·H(k+1)t1,...,tk+1Uk+1(ρ
(k)
t1,...,tk
, s¯
(k)
t1,...,tk
) = z¯]|
≤ γ.
We then construct G(k+1)t1,...,tk+1 and S
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
for each H(k+1)t1,...,tk+1 . Following the same proof, we
can show that for all z¯
|
∑
t1,...,tk
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk · Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FUk+1(ρ(k)t1,...,tk , s¯
(k)
t1,...,tk
) = z¯]−
∑
t1,...,tk+1
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk+1 Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · G(k+1)t1,...,tk+1Uk+1(ρ
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
, s¯
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
) = z¯]|
≤ γ +
√
(1 + δ)
qk+1
2n
.
Moreover, the output of the scheme with access to {G(k+1)t1,...,tk+1} is
ρ(k+1) :=
∑
t1,...,tk+1
pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk+1 · ρ(k+1)t1,...,tk+1
which satisfies that ρ
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
is uncorrelated to the mappings in S
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
. We let
s¯(k+1) :=
∑
t1,...,tk+1
(pt1 · · · pt1,...,tk+1 s¯(k+1)t1,...,tk+1),
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where s¯
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
:= (P
(k+1)
t1,...,tk+1
, a¯) is ideal with probability 1− poly(n)2n . Then, for all z¯
|Pr[BF (s¯(u)) = z¯]− Pr[BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) = z¯]|
= |Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1F · · · FU1(ρ(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]−∑
t1,...,td
pt1 · · · pt1,...,td Pr[Π0/1 ◦ Ud+1G(d)t1,...,td · · · G
(1)
t1
U1(ρ
(0), s¯(0)) = z¯]|
≤ dγ +
d∑
i=1
√
(1 + δ)
qi
2n
. (17)
Eq. 17 follows from the hybrid argument and the indistinguishability we have just proven by math
induction.
Finally, we need to show that the output of BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) is ideal with probability 1 − poly(n)2n .
The output can be represented by
BGs¯(u) (s¯(u)) :=
∑
t1,...,td
pt1 · · · pt1,...,td s¯(d)t1,...,td
and
s¯
(d)
t1,...,td
:= (a¯′, P (d)t1,...,td)).
First, we show that |P (d)t1,...,td | is at most a polynomial in n. The number of fixed paths by
the sequence of shadows is at most d · p′+log 1/γlog 1+δ . We set γ = 1/ poly(n) and δ = O(1) such
that dγ +
∑d
i=1
√
(1 + δ) qi2n ≤ d
√
poly(n)
2n and |P
(d)
t1,...,td
| is at most poly(n). Moreover, since a¯ is
uncorrelated to f given P , the additional paths fixed in G(1)t1 , . . . ,G
(d)
t1,...,td
is also uncorrelated to
f given P0. This implies that the probability that P
(d)
t1,...,td
gives the hidden shift s is at most
(|P (d)t1,...,td |+1)
2
2n−(|P (d)t1,...,td |+1)2
. In the last, the bit string a¯′ is from the quantum state Ud+1ρ(d)U
†
d+1 and a¯. Since
ρ(d) is uncorrelated to f∗d conditioned on P
(d)
t1,...,td
, a¯′ must be uncorrelated to f conditioned on
P
(d)
t1,...,td
.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 8.1.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. We first consider L1. Since the input of L1 does not have any short advice
which is correlated to all F , we can use the analysis in Theorem 7.1 to show that there exists a
sequence of shadow G(1) such that
|Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L1)F () = s]− Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L2)F ◦ LG(1)1 () = s] ≤ d
√
poly(n)
2n
,
and the output of LG
(1)
1 is ideal with probability 1− poly(n)2n and must be semi-ideal. Or, alternatively,
we can follow Lemma 8.9, which also gives the same conclusion.
Then, we apply Lemma 8.9 to replace the oracle of L2,
|Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L2)F (LG(1)1 ()) = s]− Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L3)F ◦ LG
(2)
2 (L
G(1)
1 ()) = s] ≤ d
√
poly(n)
2n
.
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We continuously replace the oracle of Li for i = 1, . . . ,m according to Lemma 8.9. Finally, we can
get the inequality
|Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L1)F () = s]− Pr[LG(m)m ◦ · · · ◦ LG
(1)
1 () = s] ≤ dm
√
poly(n)
2n
. (18)
Then, the rest to show is that Pr[(LG
(m)
m ◦ · · · ◦ LG
(1)
1 () = s] is negligible. By Lemma 8.9, the
output of LG
(m)
m ◦ · · · ◦ LG
(1)
1 () is ideal with probability at least 1 − poly(n)2n . Then, by applying
Claim 8.8,
Pr[Ac
(
LG
(m)
m ◦ · · · ◦ LG
(1)
1 ()
)
= s] ≤ poly(n)
2n
. (19)
Finally, by combining Eq. 18 and Eq. 19,
Pr[(Lm ◦ · · · ◦ L1)F () = s] ≤ dm
√
poly(n)
2n
+
poly(n)
2n
.
This completes the proof.
8.3 On separating the depth hierarchy of d-CQ scheme
By using the same proof for Theorem 8.1, we can show that the d-SSP is also hard for any d-CQ
scheme.
Theorem 8.10. The d-SSP cannot be decided by any d-CQ scheme with probability greater than
1
2 +
√
poly(n)
2n .
Proof. Following the proof for Theorem 8.1, there exist G(1),G(2), . . . ,G(m) such that A cannot
distinguish F from G(1),G(2), . . . ,G(m). Moreover, in case that f is a random Simon function, A
with access to G(1), . . . ,G(m) cannot find s. Therefore, Pr[AF () = 1] ≤ 1/2 +md ·
√
poly(n)
2n
Corollary 8.11. For any d ∈ N, there is a (2d + 1)-CQ scheme which can solve the d-SSP with
high probability, but there is no d-CQ scheme which can solve the d-SSP.
Proof. This corollary follows from Theorem 8.10 and Theorem 4.11 directly.
Finally, we can conclude that
Corollary 8.12. Let O and L(O) be defined as in Def. 4.10. L(O) ∈ BQPO and L(O) /∈
(BPPBQNC)
O
.
Proof. Note that each n ∈ N, Ofn,d(n)unif ∈ O has depth equal to the input size. A quantum circuit
with depth poly(n) can decide whether fn is a Simon’s function by Theorem 4.11 and thus decides
if 1n is in L(O). However, for d-CQ scheme which only has quantum depth d = poly log n, it cannot
decide the language by Theorem 8.10.
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